

Message Text

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CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 13524

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON CHINA

REF: A. MOSCOW 13054 (PARA 5); B. MOSCOW 12769

1. SUMMARY. IN A WIDE-RANGING CONVERSATION ON SOVIET VIEWS OF CHINA, MFA CHINA DESK OFFICER KIREYEV SAID THAT DESPITE CRITICAL MEDIA COVERAGE, SOVIET POLICY TOWARD CHINA HAD NOT CHANGED AND THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS HAD NOT VARIED FROM THEIR LOW BUT STEADY LEVEL OF RECENT YEARS. HE SHOWED IRRITATION AT PEKING'S REFUSAL TO LET THE SOVIET VETERANS' DELEGATION LAY WREATHS AND CHARGED THAT THE CHINESE DESECRATE SOVIET GRAVES. HE PLAYED DOWN ANY NEAR-TERM "THREAT" FROM CHINA BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER
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THE LONG-TERM PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE "MILITARIZATION" OF THE

COUNTRY. ON PEKING'S DEALINGS WITH JAPAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, HE SAID THAT MOSCOW SOUGHT TO "WARN" OTHERS, NOT TO "CRITICIZE" THEM, AND REITERATED THAT PEKING NOW SEEKS TO EXPAND TO THE SOUTH. ON DOMESTIC PRC DEVELOPMENTS, HE SAW THE "SHUI HU" CAMPAIGN AS A MOVE BY THE "RADICALS" AGAINST THE "PRAGMATISTS", POSSIBLY JOINED BY A NEW FACTION WHICH HE CALLED THE "ECONOMISTS". HE WAS VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT NAMING SPECIFIC TARGETS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT CHANG CHUN-CHIAO COULD BE ONE OF THOSE WHO HAS LEARNED THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MUST BE THE COUNTRY'S FIRST PRIORITY. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY COULD BE DECISIVE, HE SAID, AND WOULD PROBABLY FAVOR ORDER AND STABILITY. KIREYEV DISTINGUISHED IMPLICITLY BETWEEN THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION AND THE "MILITARIZATION" OR REGIMENTATION OF THE COUNTRY FOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS. HE POSTULATED A SUCCESSOR REGIME MORE CONCERNED WITH INTERNAL THAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. END SUMMARY.

2. EMBOFF CALLED ON GENRIK KIREYEV ON SEPT 18 TO DISCUSS RECENT SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARY AND GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRC. KIREYEV BEGAN BY ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE RECENT ARTICLES WERE IMPORTANT, PARTICULARLY THE ONE IN THE AUGUST ISSUE OF KOMMUNIST AND THE IZVESTIYA ITEM BY VLADIMIROV (WHOM HE SAID WAS A MEMBER OF THE CHINA SECTION OF THE FAR EAST INSTITUTE, NOT A PSEUDONYM) (REFTELS). THESE ARTICLES, SAID KIREYEV, DO NOT REPRESENT ANY DEPARTURE FOR SOVIET POLICY BUT THEY TAKE ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA SINCE THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS AND THE KOMMUNIST ARTICLE WAS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE IN SOVIET MEDIA TO DO SO. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, HE SAID, HAVE NEITHER IMPROVED NOR DETERIORATED LATELY, BUT REMAIN AT AN EVEN LOW LEVEL.

3. IN RESPONSE TO EMBOFF'S QUERY ON PRAVDA'S (SEPT 16) BRIEF MENTION OF THE SOVIET HELICOPTER CREW STILL BEING HELD IN CHINA, KIREYEV CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS THE FIRST SUCH MENTION IN SOVIET MEDIA IN OVER A YEAR AND SAID THAT IT WAS MERELY A MEANS OF REMINDING PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES THAT THE ISSUE IS NOT FORGOTTEN. MOSCOW HAS HAD NO WORD ON THE FATE OF THE FLIERS, HE SAID, BUT BELIEVES THAT PEKING'S INTENTION IS TO USE THEM FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. KIREYEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CHINESE HAD IN FACT SAID ALMOST NOTHING ABOUT THEM, BUT WENT ON TO CLAIM THAT THEY COULD DO SO WHEN THEY WISHED.

4. KIREYEV SAID THAT THE ANNUAL SINO-SOVIET TRADE TALKS HAD BEEN CONFIDENTIAL

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DRAWN OUT LONGER THAN USUAL BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENTS OVER PRICING. AT THE OUTSET, HE SAID, THE CHINESE PROPOSED THAT THIS YEAR'S TRADE BE VALUED AT WORLD MARKET PRICES AND THE SOVIETS AGREED. BUT THE CHINESE, HE CLAIMED, THEN ATTEMPTED TO PRICE THEIR GOODS EVEN HIGHER THAN THE WORLD LEVELS. (HE COMPARED THIS WITH THE REPORTED PRICE INCREASE AT THE SPRING CANTON FAIR.) THE CHINESE PRESENTED THEIR PRICES ON A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT BASIS, HE SAID, THUS TRADE THIS YEAR WILL SHOW LITTLE CHANGE IN THE VOLUME OF

GOODS EXCHANGED BUT BECAUSE OF THE NEW PRICING WILL SHOW SOME INCREASE IN VALUE.

5. ON IL'ICHEV'S LAST ROUND OF BORDER TALKS WHICH ENDED IN MAY, KIREYEV SAID THAT NOTHING SIGNIFICANT HAD OCCURRED. IL'ICHEV HAD GONE BACK TO PEKING TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP AFTER THE NATIONAL PEOPLES CONGRESS WAS INTERESTED IN SETTling THE BORDER DISPUTE, HE SAID, BUT IL'ICHEV SOON LEARNED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN PEKING'S BASIC POSITION.

6. KIREYEV THEN DIGRESSED TO DISCUSS THE BORDER TALKS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN 1960 AND 1964, IN WHICH HE HAD TAKEN PART. HE SAID THAT BETWEEN FEBRUARY AND SEPTEMBER 1964 THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED ON THE ENTIRE DELINEATION OF THE BORDER IN THE EASTERN SECTOR FOR A DISTANCE OF 4,000 KILOMETERS, EXCEPT FOR ONE QUESTION WHICH CONCERNED THE TWO ISLAND (OR ONE ISLAND AS THE CHINESE CLAIM, HE SAID) OPPOSITE Khabarovsk. WHEN THE TALKS RECESSED IN SEPTEMBER 1964, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED A RESUMPTION ON OCTOBER 15. TO SOLVE THIS SOLE REMAINING PROBLEM, BUT THE CHINESE NEVER REPLIED. THE SOVIETS BEGAN TO NOTICE A HARDENING IN THE CHINESE POSITION IN JULY OF THAT YEAR AND THEY ATTRIBUTED IT TO MAO PERSONALLY. MAO HAD MET IN JULY WITH A GROUP OF JAPANESE VISITORS AND REPORTEDLY ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE MAKING TERRITORIAL DEMANDS AGAINST CHINA. FROM THAT TIME ON THE CHINESE SEEMED LESS INTERESTED IN REACHING A SOLUTION. CONCERNING THE WESTERN SECTOR, KIREYEV INDICATED THAT BOTH SIDES HAD PUT FORTH THEIR POSITIONS, INCLUDING THEIR VIEWS ON THE PAMIRS, BUT NO TALKS HAD SO FAR BEEN HELD TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES. ASKED WHETHER THE CHINESE OR THE SOVIETS NORMALLY INITIATE THE RESUMPTION OF THE IL'ICHEV TALKS, KIREYEV INDICATED THAT EITHER SIDE CAN DO SO BUT THAT THE LAST TWO ROUNDS HAD BEEN AT SOVIET INITIATIVE.

7. KIREYEV SAID THAT THE RECENT CHINESE REFUSAL TO ALLOW A
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SOVIET VETERANS' DELEGATION TO VISIT THE GRAVES OF SOVIETS WHO HAD FALLEN ON CHINESE SOIL IN THE BATTLE AGAINST JAPAN AND FOR THE LIBERATION OF CHINA HAD BEEN MUCH HARsher THAN USUAL. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT LIKE THE ROUTINE CHINESE REFUSALS FOR MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY STAFF TO VISIT THE GRAVES ON SOVIET ARMY DAY EACH YEAR. THIS PROPOSAL CAME FROM THE SOVIET VETERANS COMMITTEE, AND WAS THEREFORE ON A DIFFERENT LEVEL. IN 1965 (THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF V-J DAY) THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO LAY WREATHS AND IN 1970 (THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY) THE CHINESE HAD NOT REPLIED TO THE SOVIET REQUEST. THIS TIME THEIR NOTE CHARGED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION PLANNED TO CARRY ON ESPIONAGE AND OTHER ANTI-CHINESE ACTIVITY. THE CHINESE HAD NO RESPECT FOR THE MEMORIES OF THOSE SOVIETS WHO HAD SERVED THE COMMON CAUSE, KIREYEV ASSERTED. WHEN A SOVIET DELEGATION HAD GONE TO LAY WREATHS IN MANCHOULI EARLIER THIS YEAR, THEY FOUND THAT THE GRAVES HAD BEEN NEGLECTED

AND ABUSED. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS HUMAN DEFECATION ON SOME OF THEM. WHICH THE DELEGATION REMOVED. THE NEXT DAY THERE WAS MORE. THIS COULD NOT HAVE ACCIDENTAL, SAID KIREYEV, BUT WAS A CALCULATED INSULT.

8. THE MOST ALARMING ASPECT OF PEKING'S ATTITUDE ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, SAID KIREYEV, IS THE IMPETUS IT GIVES TO THE "MILITARIZATION" OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY. ONE COULD NOT PREDICT THE EFFECTS OF THE INDOCTRINATION OF THE YOUTH OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS WITH SLOGANS ABOUT WAR AND HATE. ADDED TO THIS IS THE HIGH DEGREE OF SOCIAL DISCIPLINE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE, SAID KIREYEV. ONE COULD NOT COMPARE MAO'S CHINA WITH HITLER'S GERMANY, BUT THE FACTORS OF MILITARIZATION AND DISCIPLINE WERE SIMILARLY DISTURBING. KIREYEV SAID THAT HE RETAINED GREAT RESPECT FOR THE CHINESE PEOPLE, THEIR SOCIETY AND THEIR CULTURE, FROM THE THIRTEEN YEARS (1949-62) HE HAD LIVED IN CHINA. BUT HE ALSO FELT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 13524

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THAT THERE WAS A THREATENING SIDE TO THE CHINESE CHARACTER WHICH WAS THE OBVERSE OF ITS GOOD SIDE, AND WHICH ALLOWED THE REGIME TO MANIPULATE THE PEOPLE FOR ITS OWN NARROW PURPOSES. AS EVIDENCE HE CITED THE ABRUPT CHANGE IN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WAS REFLECTED BOTH THROUGH INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM THE SOVIETS HAD LONG HAD DEALINGS, AND IN THE REGIME'S ABILITY TO MOUNT MASSIVE ANTI-SOVIET DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE DROP OF AN ORDER.

9. ON THE PROSPECTIVE JAPAN-CHINA TREATY, KIREYEV SAID THAT MOSCOW WAS GREATLY CONCERNED THAT JAPAN WOULD ACCEPT CHINA'S INSISTANCE ON A "HEGEMONY" CLAUSE. ALTHOUGH SUCH TERMINOLOGY HAS BEEN USED IN SEVERAL JOINT COMMUNIQUE, HE SAID, A TREATY IS DIFFERENT. SEVERAL CHINESE LEADERS HAVE SAID THAT THIS WORDING IS DIRECTED AGAINST MOSCOW, SO HOW COULD MOSCOW IGNORE IT, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY. ASKED WHAT THE PURPOSE WAS FOR CRITICIZING JAPAN, CONFIDENTIAL

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SINCE JAPANESE OFFICIALS HAD OFTEN SAID THAT IN THEIR VIEW THE TREATY WOULD NOT BE DIRECTED AT ANYONE, KIREYEV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT "CRITICIZE" JAPAN, BUT MERELY "WARN" IT NOT TO BE TAKEN IN BY PEKING'S DESIGNS. THERE IS A RUSSIAN SAYING, HE SAID, THAT 'IT IS BETTER TO DESTROY THE SEED THAN TO TRY TO ERADICATE THE WEED.' THE "THREAT," HE EMPHASIZED, IS ONLY POTENTIAL. BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED.

10. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE APPARENT CALM IN THE U.S. ATTITUDE ABOUT THE JAPANESE-CHINESE TREATY SINCE THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE COULD WELL DIRECT THEIR ANIMOSITY AT THE U.S. UNDER THE SAME TERMINOLOGY. BACKTRACKING A BIT, HE THEN SAID THAT MOSCOW DOES NOT SEE THE TREATY AS A DIRECT THREAT BUT AS A POTENTIAL PROBLEM FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN EAST ASIA. TO A QUESTION ON HOW THIS TREATY WOULD DIFFER FROM THE SOVIET-INDIAN TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP, KIREYEV REACTED SHARPLY, SAYING THAT NEITHER MOSCOW NOR NEW DELHI HAD ASSERTED THAT THE TREATY WAS DIRECTED AT PEKING. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NO MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVISION IN THAT TREATY BUT MERELY A CALL FOR "CONSULTATIONS" IN CASE EITHER PARTY IS THREATENED.

11. REGARDLESS OF ITS POSSIBLE TREATY WITH JAPAN, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS DO NOT CONSIDER THAT CHINA IS A THREAT FOR THE PRESENT, SAID KIREYEV, AND HAVE NOTED THAT PEKING HAS DOWNPLAYED ITS ALLEGATIONS ABOUT A SUPPOSED "THREAT FROM THE NORTH." PEKING'S GAZE NOW IS SOUTHWARD, SAID KIREYEV, WHERE IT SEEKS CONQUEST NOT BY FORCE OF ARMS BUT THROUGH "PENETRATION." SOVIET ATTENTION TO SOUTH-EAST ASIA IN RECENT MONTHS IS AN EFFORT TO "WARN"(I.E., NOT TO "CRITICIZE") SOUTHEAST ASIA ABOUT THE MENACE FROM PEKING. UNLIKE THE CHINESE, THE SOVIETS HAVE NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, SAID KIREYEV, AND SEEK ONLY PEACE AND STABILITY FOR THE REGION. KIREYEV SAID HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD WELCOME AN OPPOR-

TUNITY FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO VISIT SOUTHEAST ASIA IF THE ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPORTED INVITATION FROM THE THAI FOREIGN MINISTER.

12. TURNING TO INTERNAL MATTERS, KIREYEV SAID THAT SOVIET ANALYSTS VIEW THE NEW "SHUI HU" CAMPAIGN AS A LEFTIST ATTACK ON THE SO-CALLED "MODERATES" OR "PRAGMATISTS." KIREYEV WAS VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT SPECULATING ON SPECIFIC TARGETS OF THE CAMPAIGN BUT SAID THAT IN HIS TENTATIVE OPINION, TENG HSAIO-PING IS PROBABLY NOT A TARGET. CONFIDENTIAL

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IN KIREYEV'S VIEW, THE "RADICALS" HAD LAUNCHED THE "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" CAMPAIGN AFTER THE PRAGMATISTS HAD APPARENTLY GAINED PREEMINENCE AT THE NATIONAL PEOPLES CONGRESS IN JANUARY. BUT THE "DICTATORSHIP" CAMPAIGN HAD BEEN TURNED AGAINST THE "RADICALS" BY ITS EMPHASIS ON ORDER AND STABILITY. THE TURNING POINT-- INDEED THE MEETING POINT OF THE TWO CAMPAIGNS-- HAD BEEN THE DECISION TO SEND TROOPS TO RESTORE ORDER IN THE FACTORIES. THIS SHOWED CLEARLY THAT THE EFFORTS AT RADICAL DISRUPTION WOULD BE PUT DOWN BY THOSE WHO FAVORED STABILITY AND ORDER. THE "RADICALS" HAD THEN LAUNCHED THE "SHUI HU" CAMPAIGN, WITH MAO'S BLESSING, BECAUSE THEY SAW THAT THEY HAD BEEN OUTMANEUVERED AND THAT THEIR ONLY HOPE WAS IN MOVING WHILE MAO WAS STILL ALIVE.

13. FURTHERMORE, THE SITUATION WAS BECOMING MORE COMPLEX, SAID KIREYEV, AND DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP COULD NOT BE ASCRIBED SOLELY TO "RADICALS" AND "PRAGMATISTS." (KIREYEV EXPLICITLY LINKED THE LATTER GROUP TO CHOU EN-LAI.) THE PRESENT DIFFERENCES, HE SAID, COULD ALSO REFLECT CHANGES OF VIEW AMONG THOSE WHO CAME TO POWER AS RADICALS BUT WHO HAD RUN UP AGAINST THE REALIZATION OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS. THIS GROUP, WHICH HE DUBBED THE "ECONOMISTS," HAS NOW COME TO REALIZE THAT CHINA MUST DEVELOP ECONOMICALLY IF IT IS TO BE A MAJOR POWER -- AS THE LEADERS SAY THEY WANT IT TO BE. THIS GROUP, REGARDLESS OF ITS ORIGINS, TENDS TO SIDE WITH THE "PRAGMATISTS," HE SAID, AND TO SEE THE ADVANTAGES OF INCREASED TRADE AND REDUCED CONFRONTATION, OF DIVERTING EFFORT AND RESOURCES AWAY FROM "MILITARIZATION" AND TOWARD BUILDING A BETTER LIFE FOR THE CHINESE PEOPLE. IN THIS WAY THEY COULD BE OPEN TO CHARGES OF BEING "CAPITULATIONISTS." FOLLOWING THIS LINE OF ANALYSIS, SAID KIREYEV, ONE COULD SPECULATE THAT CHANG CHUN-CHIAO MIGHT NOW BE A POSSIBLE TARGET OF THE MAOIST-RADICALS AS ONE WHO SEES THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. LIKEWISE, CHANG'S VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY, AND SPECIFICALLY ON POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, ARE NOT WELL KNOWN BUT ARE BELIEVED TO BE MODERATE, SAID KIREYEV.

14. THE OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT STRUGGLE, AND INDEED OF THE SUCCESSION TO MAO, COULD BE DETERMINED BY THE CHINESE MILITARY, HE SAID. ALTHOUGH FACTIONS ARE CLEARLY EVIDENT WITHIN THE MILITARY, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THOSE WHO WERE IDENTIFIED WITH LIN PIAO AND

THOSE WHO WERE NOT, THE MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION SEEMS MORE
INCLINED TOWARD THE PRAGMATISTS AND IN FAVOR OF AN ORDERLY POLI-
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TICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM. THE ROLE OF THE REGIONAL MILITARY
COMMANDERS COULD BE DECISIVE, SAID KIREYEV.

15. CONCERNING THE SUCCESSOR REGIME, KIREYEV SAID THAT HE
EXPECTED NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOVIET
UNION OR TOWARD OTHER OUTSIDE COUNTRIES IN THE FIRST SEVERAL YEARS.
THE MAIN BUSINESS OF THE SUCCESSORS, HE SAID, WILL BE TO KEEP THEM-
SELVES IN POWER (INCLUDING MODERATING DISPUTES AMONG THEMSELVES)
AND TO DEAL WITH THE OVERWHELMING PROBLEMS OF CHINA'S ECONOMY.
KIREYEV FELT THAT THE HIGH-LEVEL TURNOUT AT TA-CHAI IN THE PAST
FEW DAYS REFLECTED BOTH FACTORS. VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE POTENTIAL
SUCCESSORS ATTENDED SO THAT THEY COULD ALL WATCH EACH OTHER, AND
THE MEETING ITSELF WAS DEVOTED TO THE NECESSITY OF MODERNIZING
AND DEVELOPING AGRICULTURE. THE SUCCESSOR REGIME, IN KIREYEV'S
OPINION, IS LIKELY TO BE ABSORBED IN DOMESTIC QUESTIONS -- AT
LEAST IT SHOULD BE -- AND CHINA IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO PLAY A
RELATIVELY LESS ACTIVE ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS.

16. COMMENT: SEVERAL OF KIREYEV'S POINTS REPEAT THEMES HEARD
PREVIOUSLY FROM SOVIET SOURCES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE. BUT HE
BRINGS THEM TOGETHER MORE COMPREHENSIVELY AND LESS DOGMATICALLY
THAN THE MEDIA COMMENTARIES. WE ARE PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY HIS
STRONG IMPLICATION THAT THE "RADICALS" IN CHINA ARE ON THE
DEFENSIVE AND THAT THE SOVIETS NOW SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF A
RELATIVELY MODERATE SUCCESSOR REGIME WHICH MAY BE LESS
STRIDENTLY ANTI-SOVIET. KIREYEV ALSO DISTINGUISHED, IMPLICITLY
BUT CLEARLY, BETWEEN "MILITARIZATION" OF THE COUNTRY, WHICH IN HIS
VIEW IS A DANGEROUS TREND, AND THE MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION,
WHICH IS BELIEVED TO FAVOR STABILITY AND ORDER. IT MUST BE
REMEMBERED, HOWEVER, THAT KIREYEV IS A SPECIALIST, COME STEPS
AWAY FROM THE POLICY LEVEL, AND HIS VIEWS HAVE CONSISTENTLY
BEEN MORE MODERATE THAN MOSCOW'S PUBLIC STANCE AGAINST CHINA.
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